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Abstract
We first introduce and discuss density operator interpretations of quan-
tum theory as a special case of a more general class of interpretations,
giving special attention to a version that we call the ‘atomic version’.
We then review some crucial parts of the theory of stochastic processes
(the proper context in which to discuss dynamics), and develop a general
framework for specifying a dynamics for density operator interpretations.
This framework admits infinitely many empirically equivalent dynamics.
We give some examples, and discuss some of the properties of one of them.
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1 Density Operator Interpretations as Modal Interpretations
1.1 Introduction to Modal Interpretations
One way to ‘interpret’ quantum mechanics is to say, for any system, what properties
are possessed, or what observables have a definite value. The theorem of Kochen
and Specker (1967) shows that, under certain constraints (which we will take for
granted), one cannot take every observable to have a definite value. Hence the central
interpretive question: Which observables have a definite value?
There are in the literature a number of proposed answers to this question,1 the
aim of which is to prescribe, at each time, a set of possible properties (or, equivalently,
a set of definite-valued observables), i.e., those properties that may be possessed by
a system (as opposed to the properties, familiar from standard quantum mechanics,
that are neither possessed nor not possessed). In addition, of course, one needs a
probability measure over the possible properties. We are thus given an answer to any
question of the form: At time t, what properties may be possessed, and for any such
property, what is the probability that it is possessed?
These ‘properties that may be possessed’, the possible properties of a system at a
time, are probably best required to form either an algebra or a partial algebra under
the quantum-algebraic (lattice-theoretic) operations of meet, join, and orthocomple-
ment. After all, probability measures are generally taken to be defined over algebras
(or partial algebras) of events.2 As it happens, many proposals choose an algebra
of a certain kind, dubbed a faux-Boolean algebra. These algebras are constructed
(in Hilbert space) as follows. Choose any set, S, of mutually orthogonal subspaces
in the Hilbert space. Let S⊥ be the set of all subspaces orthogonal to the span of
S. The algebraic closure (under meet, join, and orthocomplement) of S ∪ S⊥ is a
faux-Boolean algebra. We will mainly be concerned with proposals that choose for
their algebra of possible properties a faux-Boolean algebra, though we will point out
when our results generalize to other proposals.
One must, of course, adopt the quantum-mechanical probability measure over the
algebra of possible properties. That is, for any system with the state (statistical
operator), W , the probability that the system possesses the property P is given by
Tr[WP ], where P is, of course, an element in the system’s faux-Boolean algebra of
possible properties. (We do not distinguish notationally among projection operators,
subspaces, and properties.) Moreover, all extant proposals of the sort considered
here (i.e.that choose a faux-Boolean algebra) choose S so that every property in S⊥
has probability zero. That is, all of these proposals make the faux-Boolean algebra
of properties state-dependent, and do so in such a way that every element of S⊥
is in the null space of W . (This requirement guarantees that the probability theory
generated by modal interpretations is effectively classical. See Dickson (1995a, 1995b)
for discussion. See also Bell and Clifton (1995) and Zimba and Clifton (1998) for
discussions of the algebraic structure of possible properties.)
For every property, P , in a faux-Boolean algebra, B, of possible properties, then,
we may say that P is either possessed or not by a system (at a given time). The
complete set of possessed properties for a given system (at a given time) is therefore
a map, m : B → {0, 1} (‘0’ for ‘not possessed’ and ‘1’ for ‘possessed’). It is easy
to show that, because we have adopted the quantum-mechanical probability measure
over B, m must be an ultrafilter on B. That is, m must map one and only one atom,
Patom, of B to 1, and for every other element, P , of B, m(P ) = 1 if and only if
PPatom = Patom (or, in terms of subspaces, Patom ⊆ P ). One can therefore specify
the complete state of a system by specifying an atom in its faux-Boolean algebra.
Moreover, as we mentioned, with probability 1 the complete state of a system will
be specified by an element of the set, S, used in the construction of its faux-Boolean
algebra. Henceforth, therefore, we will mostly restrict our attention to the elements
of S, and we refer to the actually possessed element of S as ‘the complete state’ of a
system.
1.2 The Atomic Version
We will concentrate our attention on a proposal that we call the ‘atomic version’,
but we begin with the version due to Dieks (1988, 1989) and its generalization by
Vermaas and Dieks (1995). (These are related to versions due to Kochen (1985)
and Healey (1989). See note 1 for further references.) In the above terminology,
Vermaas and Dieks construct a set, S(t), at each time, t, as follows: for any system
with a quantum-mechanical state, W (t), the elements of S(t) are the elements that
correspond to non-zero eigenvalues in the (unique) spectral resolution of W (t).
The apparent simplicity of this proposal is deceiving. The Vermaas–Dieks proposal
is meant to apply to every system individually. We should therefore ask: What counts
as a ‘system’? Possibly, Dieks’ original intuition was that every Hilbert space, Hν that
appears in some factorization, Huniv = H
α⊗Hβ ⊗ . . .Hω of the Hilbert space, Huniv,
of the universe corresponds to a system, in the above sense. (The index ν ranges
over the Greek superscripts α, β, . . ..) One then uses the statistical operator for each
such subsystem (found by tracing out the rest of the universe), to establish a faux-
Boolean algebra for that subsystem. However, it has been shown (Bacciagaluppi 1995)
that this option leads to a Kochen–Specker contradiction. Apparently, the only way
around this contradiction is to adopt some form of contextuality. (See Bacciagaluppi
and Vermaas (1997) for further discussion.) Dieks (1997) has, in fact, chosen to follow
Healey in supposing that there is a preferred factorization of the Hilbert space of the
universe (though for Dieks, the preferred factorization should be chosen, in a sense
pragmatically, to depend on the relevant interactions). Subsystems of the universe
then correspond to the factor spaces that appear in the preferred factorization of
Huniv.
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As an aside, we note that the idea of a preferred factorization is not, perhaps, as
ad hoc as it might at first appear. After all, assuming that the universe is really made
up of, say, electrons, quarks, and so on, it makes good sense to take these objects
to be the ‘real’ constituents of the universe, i.e., the bearers of properties that do
not necessarily supervene on the properties of subsystems. Indeed, it would appear
strange, if not downright silly, to suppose that, for example, a ‘system’ composed of
the spatial degrees of freedom of some electron and the spin degrees of freedom of
some atom is a genuine subsystem of the universe, deserving of its own properties
(apart from those properties that it inherits by virtue of its being composed of two
other systems).
However, even this proposal runs into difficulties. Consider, for example, a system
whose Hilbert space is Hαβ = Hα ⊗ Hβ, and one of its subsystems, whose Hilbert
space is Hα. (We refer to such systems and subsystems by the superscripts that
label the Hilbert spaces, α, β, αβ.) It can easily happen that a spectral projection,
P αβ, of W αβ (the quantum-mechanical state of αβ) does not commute with P α⊗1Iβ ,
where P α is a spectral projection of W α and 1Iβ is the identity on Hβ . But then
it is not obvious that we can escape a Kochen–Specker contradiction (and, indeed,
Clifton (1996) has derived one), or even that we can define a joint probability for
αβ to possess P αβ and α to possess P α. In fact, it is well known that there is, in
general, no expression for the joint probability for non-commuting projections that
is valid in every quantum-mechanical state. (Whether or not we wish to say that αβ
possesses P α ⊗ 1Iβ whenever α possesses P α—an assumption necessary for deriving
a Kochen–Specker contradiction—a joint probability for αβ to possess P αβ and α to
possess P α will induce a joint probability measure for P αβ and P α ⊗ 1Iβ .)
On the other hand, we do not need a general expression for the joint probability
of any two non-commuting projections, but only expressions that are valid for limited
sets of non-commuting projections. Nevertheless, while some have tried to find such
expressions, and have succeeded in special cases (Vermaas 1996), no generally accept-
able expression has yet been found. Indeed, recent results (Vermaas 1997) suggest
that no satisfactory expression will be found.
Because of these problems, we propose to adopt a still more conservative approach,
which we call the ‘atomic version’. This version adopts a preferred factorization of the
Hilbert space for the universe, and assigns faux-Boolean algebras of possible properties
directly only to those subsystems corresponding to atomic factors in the preferred
factorization (i.e., those that are not themselves tensor products of factors appearing
in the preferred factorization). All other subsystems inherit properties from these
‘atomic’ subsystems by the principle of property composition: if two subsystems, α
and β, possess the properties P αm and P
β
n , respectively, then the system composed of
α and β possesses the property P αm ⊗ P
β
n .
For example, suppose that the Hilbert space for the universe has the preferred
factorization Huniv = H
α ⊗ Hβ ⊗ . . . ⊗ Hω. The atomic version assigns a faux-
Boolean algebra to each of the subsystems α, . . . , ω. Following Vermaas and Dieks
(1995), it does so by letting Sν (the set used to generate the faux-Boolean algebra,
B
ν , for the atomic system, ν) be the set of projections with non-zero eigenvalues in
the (unique) spectral resolution of W ν , where W ν is the quantum-mechanical state
of the atomic system, ν.
As we said, in the atomic version, all compound systems have only those properties
that they inherit from their constituent atomic subsystems. Therefore, the algebra
of properties for a compound system is just the Cartesian product of the algebras of
properties for the constituent atomic subsystems. To complete the atomic version,
therefore, we need only the joint probabilities for properties of all subsystems. The
other joint probabities are obtained by additivity. As Vermaas and Dieks (1995) have
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already noted, the obvious candidate is
Pr
(
P αiα , P
β
iβ
, . . . , P ωiω
)
= Tr[WP αiα ⊗ P
β
iβ
⊗ . . .⊗ P ωiω ]. (1)
From this expression, it is clear that while atomic systems α and β might have
non-zero probability to possess the properties P α and P β, respectively, it might still
happen that the compound system αβ has zero probability to possess the property
P α ⊗ P β. (Think, for example, of the singlet state of two spin-1/2 particles.) In this
case one might like to say that P α⊗P β should not be in the set, Sαβ, used to generate
the faux-Boolean algebra of properties for the compound system αβ. However, such
a policy would make the problem of finding a dynamics even harder than it already
is. The reason is that finding a dynamics is made more difficult when the cardinality
of the set, Sαβ, can change in time. (This point should become clear in Sections 2
and 3.) Hence we adopt the policy that the faux-Boolean algebra of properties for a
compound system is indeed generated by the set
S :=
{
P = P αiα ⊗ . . .⊗ P
ω
iω
| P αiα ∈ S
α, . . . , P αiω ∈ S
ω
}
, (2)
where the Hilbert space for the compound system is H = Hα⊗ . . .⊗Hω, α, . . . , ω are
atomic systems, and for all ν, Sν is the set used to generate the faux-Boolean algebra
of properties for the atomic system ν. This construction differs from the perhaps
more natural one, given by the additional constraint that Tr[WP ] 6= 0 (where W is
the state of the compound system), only on properties that have zero probabilty.
To finish this discussion, and to foreshadow the discussion of Section 3, note that
in general the sets Sν are time-dependent. Our work here may therefore be seen as
a generalization of work by Bohm (1952), Bell (1987), Vink (1993), and Bub (1996,
1997). They consider a dynamics for a ‘preferred observable’, R, considered to have
a definite value at all times. For us, the preferred observable is time-dependent.
That is, we may take it to be some observable, R(t), whose eigenprojections are the
elements of S(t) (the set S as given by (2) at some time, t), and whose eigenvalues are
arbitrary. Indeed, as we shall see, our work applies to any time-dependent preferred
observable whose eigenprojections and eigenvalues evolve differentiably. (We return
to this point in greater detail later.)
There is plenty more one might say about the atomic version, but we will not
linger over its motivation or consequences here. As we said above, our results will be
geared mainly towards the atomic version, though we will note how and under what
conditions our results can be applied to non-atomic versions.
(Lest we appear overly optimistic about the prospects for the atomic version,
we note that one outstanding problem has not been solved: we have not shown
that it will attribute ‘the right’ properties to macroscopic objects. For example,
we have not shown that it entails that macroscopic objects are well-localized. This
question has been addressed in detail, with ultimately negative results, for non-atomic
interpretations.3)
1.3 The Problem
Thus far we have specified, for every time t, the set of possible modal states, S(t),
and a probability measure over this set. However, one wants to know more. We take
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it to be crucial to answer dynamical questions, of the form: Given that a system
possesses property P at time s, what is the probability that it will possess property
P ′ at time t (t > s)? In other words, we need a dynamics of possessed properties.
Some may consider a dynamics of possessed properties to be superfluous. After
all, could quantum mechanics not get away with just single-time probabilities? Why
can we not settle for an interpretation that supplements standard quantum mechanics
only by providing in a systematic way a set (the set of possible properties) over which
single-time probabilities are defined? If we require of this set that it include the
everyday properties of macroscopic objects,4 then what more do we need?
What we need is an assurance that the trajectories of possessed properties are, at
least for macroscopic objects, more or less as we see them to be. For example, we
should require not only that the book at rest on the desk has a definite location, but
also that, if undisturbed, its location relative to the desk does not change in time.
Hence one cannot get away with simply specifying the definite properties at each
time. We need also to be shown that this specification is at least compatible with a
reasonable dynamics. Even better, we would like to see the dynamics explicitly.5 (As
we will note below, it is trivial to define an ‘unreasonable’ dynamics, namely, one in
which there is no correlation from one time to the next. In such a case, the book on
the table might not remain at rest relative to the table, even if undisturbed. We take
it that such dynamics are not very interesting, and fail to provide any assurance that
we can describe the world more or less as we think it is.6)
Our main task in this paper is to show how to construct a dynamics describing
time-evolution of the complete state of a system. We will investigate some features
of one example, with an eye towards suggesting that there are likely to be at least
some dynamics that are ‘reasonable’.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we will
discuss the general framework of stochastic processes, the appropriate mathematical
theory for the rigorous description of a dynamics. In particular, we will discuss the
question of how to find finite-time transition probabilities. This problem is much-
discussed among theorists of stochastic processes. In Section 3, we develop a general
framework for the description of dynamics for complete states. Here we show how to
specify infinitesimal parameters that are guaranteed to return the single-time proba-
bilities already defined via quantum theory. In Section 4, we discuss some constraints
on dynamics first derived by Vermaas (1996), and we give some examples of dynamics,
spending particular attention on one that we call the generalized Schro¨dinger dynam-
ics. In Section 5 we discuss some of the properties of the generalized Schro¨dinger
dynamics, and we mention some problems for future research. (A review of research
on dynamics will appear in Bacciagaluppi (1998a).)
2 Preparatory Discussion of Dynamics
2.1 Stochastic Processes
It is evident that the dynamics we are after will be genuinely probabilistic. This
point can be seen in a trivial example. Let
|Ψ(t)〉 :=
∑
i
ci(t)|αi〉 ⊗ |βi〉, (3)
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where |αi〉 ∈ H
α and |βi〉 ∈ H
β . Then the spectral resolution of W α(t) is at all
times given by {P αi } (= {|αi〉〈αi|}), unless there happens to be a degeneracy (in
which case the projections in the unique spectral resolution of W α would be given
by sums of elements of {P αi })—we will assume for this example that there are no
degeneracies. But the probabilities attached to these spectral projections will change,
due to the time-dependence of the ci(t). Now, consider an ensemble of systems, all
with state vector |Ψ(t)〉 and with modal states distributed across {P αi } according to
the quantum-mechanical probability measure, |ci(t)|
2. As the distribution, |ci(t)|
2,
changes in time, some members of the ensemble must make transitions among the
{P αi } in order to preserve the distribution.
Why can these transitions not be deterministic? Because, assuming that the
compete state specifies completely the physical state of the system, there can be
nothing to distinguish those systems that make a transition from, say, P α1 to, say, P
α
2
from those systems that make a transition from P α1 to some property other than P
α
2
(or make no transition at all). There is therefore nothing in the theory that could
have ‘determined’ the transition from P α1 to P
α
2 .
Deterministic ‘equations of motion’ for the complete states are therefore out of
the question. Instead, we need stochastic equations of motion. The most general
and powerful framework within which to find and study such equations is the theory
of stochastic processes. We shall therefore put our question into this framework,
allowing us to borrow and adapt some well-known results from that theory.
We remind the reader of some basic definitions. (There are many books on the
topic. Classic texts are Doob (1953) and, in particular, Feller (1968).) A random
variable, V , is a map from a sample space (the set of all atomic events in some algebra
of events) to the real numbers. The probability measure over (the algebra generated
by) the sample space induces a probability measure over (the algebra generated by)
the range of V . We therefore ignore the sample space itself, and consider directly the
probability measure over the range of V , also called the state space of V , writing:
pVi := p(V = i), (4)
defined for all i in the state space of V . Because the context makes the meaning clear,
we will usually omit the superscripted V , writing pi.
A stochastic process, Vt is an indexed family of random variables with a com-
mon state space. For us, the index t will be continuous, and it will represent time.
Moreover, for us, the state space will be a set of integers, I. Single-time probability
distributions are written:
pVti (t) := p(Vt = i) (5)
for all i in the state space, I, of Vt. Again, we usually write pi(t).
Given a complete set of finite-time transition probabilities, that is, the joint dis-
tribution functions,
p(Vt1 = i1, Vt2 = i2, . . . , Vtn = in), (6)
for every set of times, {t1, . . . tn} (where of course im ∈ I for all m in {1, . . . , n}), we
can define the finite-time transition probabilities in the usual way by
p(Vt = i|Vt1 = i1, . . . , Vtn = in) :=
p(Vt1 = i1, . . . , Vtn = in, Vt = i)
p(Vt1 = i1, . . . , Vtn = in)
, (7)
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where t > tm for allm in {1, . . . , n}. Equation (7) represents the most general form for
the finite-time transition probabilities, and without making any further restrictions,
a complete dynamics requires a complete set of such probabilities. However, we will
restrict attention here to Markov processes, that is, processes that obey the Markov
property:
Markov Property: Whenever t1 < t2 < . . . < tn < t,
p(Vt = i|Vt1 = i1, . . . Vtn = in) = p(Vt = i|Vtn = in). (8)
We therefore need to find only a complete set of transition probability functions,
pji(t, s) := p(Vt = j|Vs = i), (9)
for all s ≤ t. We require, for obvious reasons, that pii(t, t) = 1 and pji(t, t) = 0 for
i 6= j. (Note that the transition probability function is read from right to left: pji(t, s)
is the probability of a transition from i at time s to j at time t.)
Now, one could try to specify directly all of the pji(t, s), but this strategy is too
unwieldy. It is more common, and more convenient in the end, to begin by defining
the so-called infinitesimal parameters (defined in the next subsection); then one uses
the infinitesimal parameters to build up the finite-time transition probabilities.
Of course, there is one trivial way to specify directly all of the pji(t, s). It is the
case of no correlation over time. That is, for all s, t, i, j, define
pji(t, s) := pj(t). (10)
Such transition probabilities describe the ‘unreasonable’ dynamics that we mentioned
above. They obviously return the correct single-time probabilities.
2.2 The Infinitesimal Parameters
As we said, we are seeking a dynamics that is more reasonable than (10), and
the best way to do so is to begin with the infinitesimal parameters, defined below.
However, this procedure brings with it some complications that require further dis-
cussion. In this section, we first give some definitions, and then discuss the problems
that one encounters when trying to construct finite-time transition probabilities from
the infinitesimal parameters. This problem is a standard one in the theory of Markov
processes. Our discussion will therefore be brief, and proofs will be omitted. (One
can find discussions of the results that we quote in standard books on stochastic pro-
cesses. See, for example, Doob (1953), Feller (1968), and Gikhman and Skorokhod
(1974–1979).)
The infinitesimal parameters, of a stochastic process (not necessarily Marko-
vian) are defined, for j 6= i, as the quantities
tji(t) := lim
ε→0
pji(t+ ε, t)− pji(t, t)
ε
= lim
ε→0
pji(t+ ε, t)
ε
, (11)
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if the limit on the right-hand side exists in [0,∞]. (We have used pji(t, t) = 0 for
j 6= i.) For j = i they are
tii(t) := lim
ε→0
pii(t+ ε, t)− pii(t, t)
ε
= lim
ε→0
pii(t+ ε, t)− 1
ε
, (12)
when the limit exists in [−∞, 0]. (We have used pii(t, t) = 1.)
¿From this definition of tji, it follows that
∑
j
tji(t) = 0. (13)
Intuitively, tji(t) (for j 6= i), which is always positive, is the rate at which j gains
probability at the expense of i, while tii(t) (which is always negative) is the rate at
which i loses probability. Equation (13) expresses the conservation of probability.
There is an alternative motivation of the infinitesimal parameters. Define ti(t)dt to
be the probability that the process makes a transition from state i during the interval
[t, t+ dt], assuming it is in the state i at time t. Define Πji(t) to be the probability of
a jump from i to j during the same time interval, given that the process is in the state
i at time t and that a transition takes place. It follows directly from the definitions
above (when the tji are finite) that
ti(t) = −tii(t) (14)
and
Πji(t) =
tji(t)
ti(t)
. (15)
(Note that
∑
j Πji(t) = 1.)
Equation (14) establishes a connection between the infinitesimal parameters and
the waiting time in state i. In particular, one can show that the waiting time in state
i after having arrived there at time s is exponentially distributed with parameter
ti(u). In other words, the probability that a system that arrived in the state i at time
s will remain there at least until time t is
pii(t, s) = exp
[
−
∫ t
s
ti(u)du
]
. (16)
Using (14)–(16), one can already see a connection between the infinitesimal pa-
rameters and the finite-time transition probabilities, by using ti(t) and Πji(t) to re-
construct the sample paths (realizations) of the process. We imagine that the process
begins in the state i. It waits in that state for some amount of time given (prob-
abilistically) by (16). When it makes a transition at time t, the probability that it
will go to the state j is Πji(t). Once in state j, it waits for some amount of time,
given (probabilistically) by (16), and so on. In this way, one can reconstruct all of
the sample paths of the process, and using some results from measure theory, one can
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in fact (under certain conditions) reconstruct the finite-time transition probabilities
from the knowledge of these sample paths.
However, we will follow a different route, due mainly to Kolmogorov (1931) and
Feller (1940). To begin, note that the transition probabilities of a Markov process
obey the so-called Chapman–Kolmogorov equations:
pji(t, s) =
∑
k
pjk(t, s+ h)pki(s+ h, s) (17)
for all s ≤ s+h ≤ t. The intuitive idea is just that we can ‘sum over’ an intermediate
state of the process. From the Chapman–Kolmogorov equations, one can obtain as
‘limit’ equations the so-called forward and backward Kolmogorov equations. We state
the theorem here without proof.
Theorem 1 (Kolmogorov 1931): If the infinitesimal parameters, tji(t),
for a Markov process, Vt, are well-defined, finite, and continuous for all
t, then the transition probability functions, pji(t, s), for Vt are partially
differentiable in t and s, and the following hold:
∂
∂t
pji(t, s) =
∑
k
tjk(t)pki(t, s), (18)
∂
∂s
pji(t, s) = −
∑
k
pjk(t, s)tki(s). (19)
These two equations are called the forward and backward Kolmogorov
equations, respectively.
Notice that, because by Theorem 1 the pji(t, s) are partially differentiable and
pji(t, t) = δji, one has
tji(t) =
∂
∂t
pji(t, s)
∣∣∣
s=t
. (20)
Equation (20) justifies our earlier intuitive interpretation of (11) and (12).
Note that Theorem 1 does not yet guarantee that, given a set of (well-defined,
finite, and continuous) infinitesimal parameters, tji(t), we can find a Markov process
and a set of finite-time transition probabilities for that process consistent with the
tji(t). Theorem 1 already presumes the existence of a Markov process with finite-
time transition probabilities pji(t, s), and states two relations (the backwards and
forwards equations) between these probabilities and the infinitesimal parameters. We
must therefore now ask about the existence of solutions of the Kolmogorov equations
given a set of infinitesimal parameters. Feller answered this question by showing
how (under certain conditions) to construct a so-called ‘minimal’ solution to the
Kolmogorov equations that is consistent with the given infinitesimal parameters. We
will review Feller’s construction below, but first we state the theorem.
Theorem 2 (Feller 1940): 1. Let tji(t) be a set of continuous, finite
but possibly unbounded functions on a finite or infinite open interval
T1 < t < T2, satisfying
tji ≥ 0, j 6= i, (21)
9
and ∑
j
tji(t) = 0. (22)
Then there exist absolutely continuous functions pji(t, s) on T1 < s < t <
T2 such that
0 ≤ pji(t, s) ≤ 1, (23)
∑
j
pji(t, s) ≤ 1, (24)
and such that the two Kolmogorov equations are satisfied, as well as the
Chapman–Kolmogorov equations. Further, one has
lim
ε→0+
pji(t, t− ε) = δji. (25)
2. Under certain conditions, in particular if the index set I is finite, one
has ∑
j
pji(t, s) = 1. (26)
For any other solution qji(t, s) of the Kolmogorov equations satisfying
lim
ε→0+
qji(t, t− ε) = δji one has
qji(t, s) ≥ pji(t, s). (27)
Thus, in this case, the ‘minimal’ solution pji(t, s) is the unique solution of
the Kolmogorov equations with lim
ε→0+
pji(t, t− ε) = δji and
∑
j pji(t, s) ≤ 1,
and hence the only solution that can be interpreted as a set of transition
functions.
We review Feller’s construction of the minimal solution here because it is fairly
intuitive. Feller defines
p
(0)
ji (t, s) := δji exp
[
−
∫ t
s
ti(u)du
]
, (28)
which can be interpreted as the probability that a system in the state i at time s
will be in the state j at time t, having made no transitions during the interval [s, t].
(Recall the discussion of (16).) By a careful enumeration of the possibilities, one can
extend (28) to the probability that a system in the state i at time s will be in the
state j at time t, having made n transitions during the interval [s, t]:
p
(n)
ji (t, s) :=
∑
k
∫ t
s
exp
[
−
∫ t
u
tj(v)dv
]
Πjk(u)tk(u)p
(n−1)
ki (u, s)du. (29)
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Reading (29) from right to left, it is the probability that the system starting in state
i at time s, has arrived at state k by time u having made n−1 transitions, multiplied
by the probability that it makes a transition during [u, u + du], multiplied by the
probability that this transition is to the state j, multiplied by the probability that it
remains in state j until t, integrated over all intermediate times, u, and summed over
all intermediate states k.
Feller defines the finite-time transition functions of the ‘minimal’ process to be
pji(t, s) :=
∞∑
n=0
p
(n)
ji (t, s). (30)
He then shows that pji(t, s) is a solution of both the forward and the backward
Kolmogorov equations with all the stated properties, including satisfaction of the
Chapman–Kolmogorov equations.7
One can further extend Feller’s theorem, at least in the case of finite I, to cover
infinitesimal parameters of the form tji(t) = Πji(t)ti(t) where ti(t) has singularities,
as long as these singularities are isolated and integrable (Bacciagaluppi, 1996a, Ch. 7,
Appendix 2). However, non-integrable singularities also occur, in fact very naturally,
namely whenever a probability pi(t) vanishes. If pi(t) = 0, then if pi(s) 6= 0 for
some s < t, one must also have pii(t, s) = 0. But now, by (16), in order for this
probability to vanish, ti must have a non-integrable singularity at t. Thus, a more
specific discussion of existence and uniqueness is needed in the general case.
In the next section, we shall show how to derive infinitesimal parameters for the
evolution of the complete state of a system, as defined earlier. If the corresponding
Kolmogorov equations can be uniquely solved, this will lead to Markov processes
governing the evolution of the complete state. We cannot always prove as yet the
existence of such a Markov process because of the above difficulties. On the other
hand, as we shall briefly discuss, in the context of the Bohm theory, an analogous
problem has been successfully treated already, which makes us expect that similar
existence results hold also in the present case.
3 Framework for a Modal Dynamics
3.1 Continuity of the Evolution of Spectral Projections
It is clear that the set S(t) is in general genuinely time-dependent. For example, in
the Vermaas–Dieks interpretation, it is the set of spectral projections of the statistical
operator, W (t). It is this time-dependence of S(t) that complicates the discussion of
transition probabilities.
Indeed, S(t) is time-dependent in two ways. First, the cardinality of S(t) can
change in time. For example, let
W (t) = cos2(θt)P1 + sin
2(θt)P2 (31)
for some θ, and some projections, P1 ⊥ P2. For most times, W (t) has two spectral
projections, P1 and P2, so that for these times S(t) contains two projections. However,
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when θt = npi/4 for any integer n, W (t) has just one spectral projection, so that for
these times, S(t) contains just one projection.
The second kind of time-dependence involves the time-dependence of the projec-
tions in S(t). Again a simple example is helpful. Consider a case where a system
evolves freely. That is, for W (0) =
∑
i wiPi(0), we have
W (t) = U(t)W (0)U †(t) =
∑
i
wiU(t)Pi(0)U
†(t), (32)
where U(t) is the unitary group generated by the (time-independent) Hamiltonian of
the free system.8 In this case, the cardinality of S(t) is constant, but its elements are
genuinely time-dependent.
How are we to deal with these forms of time-dependence? The first presents
a particularly difficult problem, because our aim is to take as the state space of a
stochastic process an index set, I, labeling the elements of S(t). But, the theory of
stochastic processes generally assumes that the state space is constant. The time-
dependence of the elements of S(t) presents a slightly less serious problem. Suppose
that we have solved the first problem, i.e., that the cardinality of S(t) is indeed
constant in time, so that we have a genuine state space, I. Then we need, for each
time, t, some way to associate each element of S(t) with some value in I. Of course,
we could simply assume the existence of a family of bijective maps, µt : I → S(t),
but it would be nice if instead we could exhibit them.
To begin to resolve these problems, it is useful to discover some general facts
about how the spectral projections of a statistical operator evolve. Here we show
that, in the finite-dimensional case, they evolve continuously. We also give a brief
qualitative discussion of the infinite-dimensional case. (For a more detailed treatment,
see Bacciagaluppi, Donald and Vermaas (1995).) Continuity makes easy a resolution
of the problems that arise from the genuine time-dependence of S(t) as it is presently
defined (for the atomic version).
We consider a system at a time, t = 0, with statistical operator W (0). W (0) has
a spectral resolution
W (0) =
∑
i
wi(0)Pi(0). (33)
At a time t in a neighborhood of 0, the system’s state will have a spectral resolution
W (t) =
∑
j
wj(t)Pj(t). (34)
We are interested in the relation between these two spectral resolutions.
Notice that the evolution of W (t) is continuous, i.e., for t sufficiently small, W (t)
is close to W (0) (in the trace-class norm, which is the physically relevant norm for
statistical operators). This fact by itself implies nothing for the behavior of the
spectral projections of W (t) in a neighborhood of 0. However, it suggests that we
considerW (t) as a perturbation of the operatorW (0) (induced by the time evolution),
and apply results from perturbation theory in order to compare the eigenprojections
of the perturbed and unperturbed operators. In particular, we can use Rellich’s
theorem (see for instance Kato (1966), Rellich (1969), and Reed and Simon (1978)),
the central theorem of analytic perturbation theory.
In the finite-dimensional case, Rellich’s theorem states the following. Take a
family of operators, A(z), depending on a complex parameter z, and such that A(z)
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is self-adjoint if z is real. If the dependence of A(z) on z is (complex-)analytic in
a neighborhood of a real z0, then both the eigenvalues and the eigenprojections of
A(z) are also analytic functions of z in the following sense (the assumption cannot
be weakened to real analyticity, i.e., infinite real differentiability).
If the eigenvalues of A(z) are distinct throughout a neighborhood of z0, the theo-
rem simply means that the corresponding mutually orthogonal eigenprojections Pi(z)
will be analytic functions of z in a neighborhood of z0. Instead, if the eigenvalues of
A(z) cross in z0, there is a one-to-many correspondence between the eigenprojections
of A(z) at z = z0 and z 6= z0. However, the trajectories Pi(z), which are analytic for
z 6= z0, can be analytically extended also to z = z0.
Thus, if the statistical operators W (t) (extended to a complex neighborhood of
the real line) depend complex-analytically on t, then the eigenprojections Pi(t) will be
analytic functions of t with none but removable singularities, situated at the points in
which the eigenvalues of W (t) cross. At such points, following Bacciagaluppi, Donald
and Vermaas (1995), we propose to define the definite properties of the system as the
corresponding limits of the Pi(t). This proposal is a dynamically motivated extension
of the modal interpretation. (See also the discussion by Bacciagaluppi (1996a, Ch. 6).)
To put it differently, we postulate that (for an atomic system) S(t) is not always given
by the spectral resolution of W (t), but by the set of projections that are the analytic
continuations of the eigenprojections of W (t) when the eigenvalues cross.
A particularly simple example is afforded by (31). We noted before that in that
case, S(t) contains two elements except when θt = npi/4 for any integer n. However,
these singularities are clearly isolated, and we can postulate that for times, t, such
that θt = npi/4 for some integer n, S(t) := {P1, P2}. This modification of the
definition of S(t) clearly makes the projections in S(t) evolve analytically. (Indeed,
they are constant.)
We thus only have to show that if W (t) is a statistical operator, then it is an
analytic function of t. To do so, it is sufficient to consider the so-called ‘reduced’
states, i.e., those obtained by partial tracing over the state of some ‘compound’ sys-
tem. (We assume that the state of the universe is pure, so that its spectral resolution
obviously evolves continuously.) Let the Hilbert space for the subsystem of interest
be Hα, and let the Hilbert space for the rest of the compound system (ultimately, the
rest of the universe) be Hβ. The Hilbert space for the compound system is therefore
H = Hα ⊗Hβ. We distinguish three cases, depending on the dimensionalities of the
different Hilbert spaces: (1) both Hα and Hβ are finite-dimensional; (2) Hα is finite-
dimensional, but Hβ is infinite-dimensional; (3) Hα is infinite-dimensional. Here we
shall treat explicitly only the elementary case (1), with some brief remarks on cases
(2) and (3).
We assume throughout that the total system is isolated and evolves according to
the Schro¨dinger equation with a constant Hamiltonian, H :
|Ψ(t)〉 = e−iHt|Ψ(0)〉, (35)
given the initial state |Ψ(0)〉. Let E1, . . . , EN and |e1〉, . . . , |eN〉 be the eigenvalues
and eigenvectors of H , and write
|Ψ(0)〉 =
∑
j
λj|ej〉. (36)
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Then
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
j
λje
−iEjt|ej〉. (37)
Introduce any product basis in H = Hα ⊗Hβ , with basis vectors, say, |ψαm〉 ⊗ |ψ
β
n〉.
Then, the reduced state of α is given by
W α(t) =
∑
i,j,k
λjλke
−i(Ej−Ek)t〈ψβi |ej〉〈ek|ψ
β
i 〉 (38)
(where the overbar denotes complex conjugation). Because every |ej〉 is some (finite)
linear combination of the |ψαm〉 ⊗ |ψ
β
n〉,
|ej〉 =
∑
m,n
cjmn|ψ
α
m〉 ⊗ |ψ
β
n〉, (39)
the matrix elements of W (t) will be (finite) linear combinations of the functions
e−i(Ej−Ek)t, and thus analytic in t. This result is what we needed to establish.
For case (2), it can be shown (using estimates on the trace-class norm of W α(t))
that if |Ψ(t)〉 in (35) depends analytically on t, then W α(t) also depends analytically
on t. Analyticity of |Ψ(t)〉 is assured if one restricts the initial state (36) to a certain
dense set in H. Finally, in case (3), Rellich’s theorem holds also in infinite dimensions
for eigenvalues of the unperturbed operator that are isolated and of finite multiplicity.
All nonzero eigenvalues of W α(t) are isolated and of finite multiplicity. Failure of the
theorem for the eigenvalue 0 means that trajectories can be born ¿from or can die
into the null space of W α(t). A fuller discussion of cases (2) and (3) is given in
Bacciagaluppi, Donald, and Vermaas (1995). In the following, we shall assume that
H
α is finite-dimensional and assume analyticity of W (t).
Using these results, then, the two complications mentioned earlier are resolved.
In particular, using the extended atomic version of the modal interpretation, the
cardinality of the set S(t) is time-independent, and therefore can be indexed by a
fixed index set, I, at all times. Moreover, continuity makes easy the definition of
the family of functions µt. At some initial time, t0, arbitrarily associate with each
element of S(t0) some element of the index set, I. That is, choose µt0 arbitrarily. For
all later times, µt is determined by the rule µt(i) := the (continuous) evolute of µt0(i)
for all i and all t > t0.
Using this definition of the maps µt, we can focus attention on finding transition
probabilities for a stochastic process, Vt, whose state space is I. With the help of
the map µt, such a process induces a stochastic evolution on the elements of S(t)
(as defined by the extended atomic version), which, as we saw, will itself induce a
stochastic evolution of the complete ‘modal’ state of a physical system (given by the
ultrafilters, m, as defined in Section 1.1).
As important as these results on continuity are, we note that in principle, the
problems that we have mentioned can be solved even if continuity fails. If the cardi-
nality of S(t) as originally given changes in time, then find the S(t) with the greatest
cardinality and decompose the elements of S(t) at the other times into ‘fiduciary’
elements. For example, suppose that for some t, S(t) has the greatest cardinality,
N , while S(s) (for some s 6= t) has cardinality N − 2. In that case, there must be
some multi-dimensional projections in the faux-Boolean algebra generated by S(s).
Suppose for illustration that S(s) contains a three-dimensional element, P . Then
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we can decompose P into three one-dimensional, mutually orthogonal, projections,
P = P1 + P2 + P3, replacing P in S(s) with these three projections. The resulting
faux-Boolean algebra will contain the old one as a subalgebra. Hence any dynamics
involving the new algebra will induce a dynamics on the old algebra. And obviously
the maps µt can be defined arbitrarily.
However, we also emphasize that the existence in principle of a solution to the
two problems is far less comforting than the actual existence provided by the results
on analyticity discussed above. Moreover, as we will see, at least some reasonable
dynamics require that the elements of S(t) be differentiable in time, and without the
results on analyticity, there is no guarantee of differentiability. In any case, henceforth
we ignore these details, and concentrate on finding Vt.
3.2 Infinitesimal Parameters and Single-Time Probabilities
We must now show how proceeding from a definition of the infinitesimal param-
eters to the finite-time transition probabilities (as in Theorems 1 and 2), we can
ensure that our finite-time transition probabilities are consistent with the quantum-
mechanical single-time probabilities. We do so in this section.
But first: a remark about notation. Later we will be considering compound
systems, and we will be interested in their single-time joint probabilities as well as
their joint transition probabilities. The former we denote by
pi,j,...(t) := p(α has i at t, β has j at t, . . .).
(Commas separate the indices of different subsystems.) The latter we denote by
pjn;im(t, s) := p(α has j at t, β has n at t, . . . |α has i at s, β has m at s, . . .).
(A semicolon separates the later-time indices from the earlier-time indices.) However,
we continue to denote transition probabilities for a single system by pji(t, s). (These
conventions hold also for the infinitesimal parameters.)
¿From the definition of pji(t, s) and pi(t), it is evident that
pj(t) =
∑
i
pji(t, s)pi(s) (40)
and
pj(s) =
∑
i
pij(t, s)pj(s). (41)
Therefore, we arrive at the difference equation
pj(t)− pj(s) =
∑
i
pji(t, s)pi(s)− pij(t, s)pj(s). (42)
Using (42), we can write
pj(t+ ε)− pj(t) =
∑
i
pji(t+ ε, t)pi(t)− pij(t+ ε, t)pj(t). (43)
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Divide both sides of (43) by ε and take the limit ε → 0. Assuming that the limits
exist (i.e., that the tji(t) are well-defined), we find that pj(t) is differentiable and that
p˙j(t) =
∑
i
[tji(t)pi(t)− tij(t)pj(t)] . (44)
Equation (44) is a standard master equation. (In our case, it will turn out that
tji(t) is singular only when pi(t) = 0, so that with the convention ∞× 0 = 0, (44)
holds even when tji(t) is singular.) Notice that we nowhere assumed the Markov
property in this derivation of the master equation. That is, the tji(t) could be the
infinitesimal parameters of a non-Markov process. On the other hand, we have seen
that, given tji(t), one can construct a canonical Markov process that has the tji(t)
as infinitesimal parameters, and it is this route to finite-time transition probabilities
that we follow. (There can be no construction of a unique non-Markov process from
its infinitesimal parameters because these cannot carry information about how the
history of the process affects the transition probabilities.)
The master equation (44) is the relation we need between single-time distributions
and infinitesimal parameters. We have now to investigate how one can go about
solving the master equation for the tji(t), given a set of single-time distributions pj(t)
and their derivatives. We shall follow the strategy used by Bell (1984). Like Bell, from
now on we deal exclusively with the case of a finite index set I. (Hence Theorems 1
and 2, with the above-mentioned limitations, and the results of Section 3.1 apply.)
In fact, our discussion of stochastic processes clarifies the background and possible
limitations also of the work of Bell (1984), Vink (1993) and Bub (1996, 1997).
Define a probability current jji(t) between trajectories, representing the ‘net flow’
of probability from i to j:
jji := tjipi − tijpj (45)
(where we have suppressed the argument t, as we will often do henceforth). The
definition of jji implies
jij = −jji. (46)
(That is, the jji form an antisymmetric matrix.)
Further, equation (44) implies a continuity equation for the current:
p˙j =
∑
i
jji. (47)
A solution to (44) can thus be obtained by first finding a current jji that satisfies (46)
and (47), and then, with this jji, finding functions tji that satisfy (45). By Theorems
1 and 2, at least if the tji are continuous and non-singular, one can then construct an
essentially unique stochastic process describing the evolution of the system.
Later, we shall exhibit some explicit expressions for jji. For now, we consider
how to solve (45), with the added constraint that the tji be a set of (finite-valued)
infinitesimal parameters. That is, we consider how to solve (45) under the constraints
tji ≥ 0 (j 6= i), (48)
and ∑
j
tji = 0. (49)
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The latter requirement (which is equation (13) again) defines tii in terms of the tji
for j 6= i. In fact, (45) is a system of equations for the tji with j 6= i, the equations
being vacuous for j = i. Therefore, we only need to solve (45) under the constraint
that the tji be non-negative when i 6= j.
From (45) one has (assuming pj > 0)
tij =
tjipi − jji
pj
. (50)
By (48), tij must be positive, and therefore we need tjipi − jji ≥ 0, or (for pi > 0)
tji ≥
jji
pi
, (51)
whence, again by (48),
tji ≥ max
{
0,
jji
pi
}
. (52)
From Equations (48)–(52) above, it follows that the general solution to (45), given
jji, can be found by choosing for every pair j < i a function tji that satisfies (52)
(and which can be chosen to be continuous). The tij are then uniquely determined
by (50), and the tii by (49).
The most natural choice for a solution to (45) seems therefore to be the following:
for j < i choose
tji := max
{
0,
jji
pi
}
. (53)
One easily checks with (50) that in this case also
tij = max
{
0,
jij
pj
}
. (54)
Thus, tji is given by (53) for all j 6= i. In fact, this is the choice made by Bell (1984)
for the solution of (45).
Bell’s choice is clearly motivated by the analogy with the guiding condition in
Bohm’s (1952) theory. Vink (1993) discusses how, in the appropriate sense, the Bohm
theory is in fact the continuum limit of a dynamics of this kind, and how different
solutions to (45) lead to different kinds of theories, one example being Nelson’s (1985)
stochastic mechanics.9
On the other hand, it is also clear from (45) that whenever pi = 0 and jji > 0, the
infinitesimal parameters are singular. It is actually possible to have jji = 0 whenever
pi = 0 (the current we shall construct has this property). However, as we have seen
discussing Theorem 2, singularities will arise anyway.10
We have now a canonical procedure for constructing Markov processes with given
(differentiable) single-time distributions pj. We solve the linear system of equations
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(47) for the jji under the additional constraint (46). We then define infinitesimal
parameters tji by (53). If these are continuous and regular enough, then by Theo-
rems 1 and 2 we can construct a Markov process having the tji as its infinitesimal
parameters. (In the singular case, these theorems are not enough. See the remarks
in Section 4.3.) One can also see that this Markov process will have the given pj as
its single-time distributions, by looking at the continuity equation (47) from the in-
verse perspective, now as a system of linear differential equations for the pj given the
jji. By the uniqueness theorems for systems of ordinary linear differential equations,
if two stochastic processes (Markovian or non-Markovian) share the same infinitesi-
mal parameters and the same initial distribution pj(0), then they will have the same
single-time distributions pj(t) for all t.
It is clear now that the problem of finding a dynamics, even a Markovian one, is
vastly underdetermined. Even if we limit ourselves to Bell’s choice (53) in the solution
to (45), the continuity equation (47) has infinitely many solutions that satisfy (46). It
is also clear that the requirement of continuity of the tji will not force one particular
choice of current. Our major remaining task is therefore to choose an appropriate
solution to the continuity equation (47).
Also this situation has a parallel in the Bohm theory. Ghirardi and Deotto (1997)
have recently shown that it is possible to construct infinitely many deterministic
Bohm-like theories that yield the correct single-time position distribution, simply
by adding a divergence-free term to the standard choice for the probability current
satisfying the continuity equation
d
dt
ρ(x, t) = ∇ · j(x, t). (55)
An example of such a Ghirardi–Deotto current can be seen in Bohm and Hiley’s treat-
ment of the Pauli equation as the non-relativistic limit of the Dirac equation (Bohm
and Hiley, 1993, section 10.4), where the current obtained differs by a divergence-
free term from the current used in the purely non-relativistic treatment of the Pauli
equation (ibid., section 10.2).
4 An Explicit Dynamics
4.1 The ‘Minimal Flow’ Current
We shall be concentrating on a current that we call the ‘generalized Schro¨dinger
current’, and the dynamics that it induces via (53). But first, we exhibit one other
solution, mainly because it applies to versions other than the atomic version, if they
are, indeed, feasible. (The generalized Schro¨dinger current is definable only for the
atomic version.)
As we have noted, both (45) and (47) are linear systems of equations, to be solved
under certain constraints. The case of (47) is very straightforward: the constraints are
given by the additional equations (46), which are also linear. The system consisting
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of (46) and (47) has infinitely many solutions. One possible selection criterion would
be to minimise the overall flow of probability, in the sense that, say,
∑
i,j
j2ji (56)
be minimised. This criterion is mathematically very tractable (in the finite case we
are now studying), and leads to the following current:
jji =
1
D
(p˙j − p˙i), (57)
where D is the number of elements of S. (We omit the proof: see Bacciagaluppi
(1996a, Ch. 7, Appendix 1).)
Note that this current can be applied whenever we have well-defined joint prob-
abilities for the universe, that is, joint probabilities covering the joint possession of
properties by all subsystems. For example, in the non-atomic version with a preferred
factorization given by Huniv = H
α ⊗ . . .⊗Hω, we would need joint probabilities cov-
ering all atomic systems plus all combinations of atomic systems. In a universe with
only two atomic subsystems, α and β, we could write these joint probabilities as
piα,iβ ,iαβ(t). (58)
We would then define the ‘universal current’ to be
jjαjβjαβ ; iαiβiαβ =
1
D
(p˙jα,jβ ,jαβ − p˙iα,iβ ,iαβ), (59)
where D is now the number of elements in the set of all joint states. Whenever we
have differentiable universal joint probabilities we can, in principle at least, define a
dynamics in this way.
However, such a dynamics has a number of less pleasing properties that motivate
us to seek a more ‘quantum-mechanical’ current. For example, it is clear that ‘min-
imal flow’ for the universal current does not entail minimal flow for the currents on
subsystems induced by the universal current. Moreover, as we will discuss in detail
later, there is a standard expression in quantum mechanics for the current for a time-
independent set of eigenprojections, and the minimal flow current does not reduce to
this standard current in the case where S(t) happens to be time-independent.
4.2 Deterministic Evolution for Free Systems
Before we move on to the task of finding a more satisfactory current, we pause to
discuss a result first due to Vermaas (1996). It concerns the evolution of the possessed
properties of a freely evolving system. Under certain fairly natural constraints, Ver-
maas shows that freely evolving systems must evolve deterministically. This result
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does limit the range of acceptable currents (though there seem to remain infinitely
many possibilities). In this section, we give a slightly different (and in some ways
more limited) justification for the same result, mainly because we find the example
we shall use to be instructive.
We now consider a motivation for the principle that freely evolving systems
evolve deterministically. Our motivation is not really a ‘proof’, but it is instructive
nonetheless.11
Consider a system in the initial state
|Ψ(0)〉 = |α1〉 ⊗ |β1〉, (60)
and let its evolution operator be
Uα ⊗ Uβ =
=
(
cosωt|α1〉〈α1|+ i sinωt|α2〉〈α1|+ cosωt|α2〉〈α2|+ i sinωt|α1〉〈α2|
)
⊗ 1Iβ,
(61)
where 1Iβ is the identity operator on Hβ. (This operator is unitary.) The system α
then has its own state vector, |α1〉, so that α definitely possesses P
α
1 (= |α1〉〈α1|) at
time t = 0. The evolution operator acting on |Ψ(0)〉 yields
|Ψ(t)〉 = (cosωt|α1〉+ i sinωt|α2〉)⊗ |β1〉, (62)
so that α continues to have its own state vector, cosωt|α1〉+ i sinωt|α2〉, which goes
smoothly from |α1〉 to |α2〉 and back again. Hence α ‘follows’ this smooth transition.
We might say that in this case the evolution of the complete state of α follows the
Hamiltonian evolution. The same holds if the initial state of the system is instead
|Ψ(0)〉 = |α2〉 ⊗ |β2〉. In both cases, the evolution is necessarily deterministic.
Now, suppose instead that the initial state of the system is
|Ψ(0)〉 = c1|α1〉 ⊗ |β1〉+ c2|α2〉 ⊗ |β2〉, (63)
but with the same evolution operator, (61). In this case, α initially possesses either
P α1 or P
α
2 . Indeed, the reduced statistical operator for α is
W α(t) = |c1|
2
(
cos2 ωt|α1〉〈α1|+ i sinωt cosωt|α2〉〈α1|
−i sinωt cosωt|α1〉〈α2|+ sin
2 ωt|α2〉〈α2|
)
+|c2|
2
(
sin2 ωt|α1〉〈α1| − i sinωt cosωt|α2〉〈α1|
+i sinωt cosωt|α1〉〈α2|+ cos
2 ωt|α2〉〈α2|
)
=
=: |c1|
2P ′1(t) + |c2|
2P ′2(t) . (64)
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As one would expect, P ′1(t) goes smoothly from P
α
1 to P
α
2 and back again as t goes
from 0 to pi/2ω, and conversely for P ′2(t).
Knowing that the Hamiltonian takes |α1〉 smoothly to |α2〉 and vice versa, it is
natural to suppose that here too, the evolution of the complete state follows the
Hamiltonian evolution. That is, it is natural to suppose that if the system possesses
P α1 initially, then it will at all times possess P
′
1(t), and similarly for P
α
2 and P
′
2(t).
Such an evolution is deterministic.
This argument can be repeated for any system that evolves freely. One can always
ask what the system would do if it were in a pure state (corresponding to one of the
elements in its spectral resolution, ignoring subtleties involving degeneracy, which do
not really affect the argument). The answer will be that the complete state must
evolve deterministically. But then it seems reasonable to impose this deterministic
evolution of the complete state back onto the system when its state is not pure. Hence
we shall assume that the complete state of any freely evolving system itself evolves
deterministically, ‘following’ the Hamiltonian evolution. (We emphasize again that
Vermaas (1996) has derived this result from some fairly natural conditions.)
4.3 The Generalized Schro¨dinger Current
The motivation of the previous subsection was derived partly from a desire that
the possessed properties of systems evolve in a recognizably ‘quantum-mechanical’
way. But the minimal flow current is not at all recognizably ‘quantum-mechanical’.
Nor does it yield deterministic evolution for all freely evolving systems. In this section,
we propose a current that is more quantum-mechanical and satisfies stability.
As a matter of fact, there is a fairly standard way of deriving a probability current
from the Schro¨dinger equation. (See, e.g., Cohen-Tannoudji et al. (1977, pp. 238–
240).) This kind of current is what is used in the Bohm theory to guide the motion
of particles. In Bell’s (1984) stochastic modification of the Bohm theory, it is used to
derive transition probabilities between the eigenprojections of the privileged observ-
able (‘beable’) of the theory, supposed to be fermion number density. Vink (1993)
has used Bell’s treatment to derive a probability current between eigenprojections of
any given observable, and Bub (1996, 1997) uses Bell’s and Vink’s current, which
we call the ‘Schro¨dinger current’, to define a dynamics for his own interpretation of
quantum theory.
We cannot use the Schro¨dinger current in its usual form, because in the atomic
version, the privileged observable (defined from S(t)—see the discussion in Section
1.2) is genuinely time-dependent. However, we shall generalize the Schro¨dinger cur-
rent to the case of a time-dependent privileged observable. (Hence, as we said in
Section 1.2, our work here is a generalization of the work by Bell, Vink and Bub.)
We proceed by defining a current for general composite systems—and in principle,
the universe. This current will give us a dynamics for the joint state of the universe,
which induces a dynamics for any subsystem.
Recall from Section 1.3 that the state space for the universe is given by (2) (and for
us, the universe has a finite-dimensional Hilbert space given byHuniv = H
α⊗. . .⊗Hω,
so that this state space is finite). The single-time joint probability density is given
by
piα,...,iω(t) := 〈ψ(t)|P
α
iα
(t)⊗ . . .⊗ P ωiω(t)|ψ(t)〉 . (65)
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For convenience, we will usually denote the (ordered) set of indices (iα, . . . , iω) by a
collective index, i, so that (65) can be written
pi(t) = 〈ψ(t)|Pi(t)|ψ(t)〉. (66)
Let us assume first that each Pi is one-dimensional and time-independent, given by
|ri〉〈ri| (so that {|ri〉} is an orthonormal set, and could be considered the set of
eigenvectors of the preferred observable, R, in Bub’s interpretation). Then from the
Schro¨dinger equation, it follows that
p˙i(t) = −i〈ψ(t)|ri〉〈ri|H|ψ(t)〉+ i〈ri|ψ(t)〉〈ψ(t)|H
†|ri〉 =
= 2Im
[
〈ψ(t)|ri〉〈ri|H|ψ(t)〉
]
. (67)
We must now choose a current, jji(t), that satisfies the continuity equation (47),
where p˙j(t) is given by (67). The following simple choice is the ‘textbook’ expression:
jji(t) := 2Im
[
〈ψ(t)|rj〉〈rj|H|ri〉〈ri|ψ(t)〉
]
. (68)
This current is the one used by Bell and Vink (and, Vink (1993) argues, in a suitable
limit it becomes the current of Bohm’s theory).
When the Pi are not one-dimensional, still each Pi is spanned by some set of
vectors in {|ri〉}, so that the density, time-derivative of the density, and current are
obtained by summing (66), (67), and (68) over i and j appropriately:
pi(t) = 〈ψ(t)|Pi|ψ(t)〉, (69)
p˙i(t) = 2Im
[
〈ψ(t)|PiH|ψ(t)〉
]
, (70)
jji(t) = 2Im
[
〈ψ(t)|PjHPi|ψ(t)〉
]
. (71)
We now face the problem that, for us, the Pj are genuinely time-dependent. Hence
in the density in (66), the Pi(t) are truly time-dependent, and (67) does not give the
time-derivative of pi(t). Instead, it is
p˙i(t) = 2Im
[
〈ψ(t)|Pi(t)H|ψ(t)〉
]
+ 〈ψ(t)|P˙i(t)|ψ(t)〉. (72)
We seek a current that satisfies the continuity equation (47) with the left-hand side
given by (72).
Before we go on to find such a current, we note that the approach we are now
following makes two assumptions not required by the ‘minimal flow’ dynamics of
Section 4.1. First, it assumes that the ‘universal’ single-time joint probabilities are
given by (66). In a non-atomic version, (66) does not give the single-time joint
probabilities. Nor is there any obvious way to represent a universal joint state (one
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property for each system) by any projection operator, as there is in the atomic version.
Second, our present approach assumes that the Pi(t) are differentiable. By the results
on analyticity that we discussed in Section 3.1, this assumption is acceptable.
One might wonder why we do not simply stick with the minimal flow dynamics,
or some other dynamics derived in a similar way, when the present approach is so
much less general. The answer is that we find the present approach to be much more
closely tied to traditional methods and questions in quantum mechanics, and while
such ties are no reason to rule out other approaches, they are sufficient to motivate
our pursuing this approach. Indeed, we will now show that there is a very natural
way to find a generalization of the Schro¨dinger current for time-dependent Pi(t). (The
following line of reasoning is due to James Cushing (p. c.).)
For each subsystem, ν, we write P νiν = |νi〉〈νi|. We assume that the universe
is in a pure state, and we write it in the basis given by the P νiν , i.e., in the basis
{|αiα〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ωiω〉}:
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
iα,...,iω
ciα,...,iω(t)|αiα(t)〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ωiω(t)〉. (73)
(If any of the P νiν is more than one-dimensional, then we just choose a set, {|νk〉},
such that each P νiν is spanned by some subset of {|νk〉}.) As before, we let a collective
index, i, stand in for iα, . . . , iω, so that we may write
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
i
ci(t)|qi(t)〉 (74)
for some set of (tensor-product) vectors, {|qi(t)〉}. Similarly, we label the P
α
iα
(t) ⊗
. . .⊗ P ωiω(t) with the collective index i.
At every time, t, {Pi(t)} is a set of mutually orthogonal projections, so
that there exists some family of unitary operators, {O(t, s)}, such that Pi(t) =
O(t, s)Pi(s)O
†(t, s) for all t and s. Write O(t) := O(t, 0). We define:
|Ψ′(t)〉 := O†(t)|Ψ(t)〉, (75)
so that
|Ψ′(t)〉 =
∑
i
ci(t)|qi(0)〉. (76)
Therefore, as far as the atomic version is concerned, |Ψ′(t)〉 differs from |Ψ(t)〉 only
in the fact that its definite-valued projections are time-independent (and are, in fact,
given by the definite-valued projections for |Ψ(t)〉 at time t = 0). The probabilities
attached to these time-independent projections are the same as the probabilities at-
tached to their time-dependent images under the map given by O(t). But we already
know how to write down a current for the time-independent case. So the obvious
strategy is to write down the current for |Ψ′(t)〉, then translate the result back in
terms of the time-dependent projections, again using the map given by O(t). In this
way, we will have derived in a very natural manner a current associated with |Ψ(t)〉,
for the time-dependent set S(t).
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Using (75) and the Schro¨dinger equation, we have that
i
∂|Ψ′(t)〉
∂t
= iO˙†(t)|Ψ(t)〉+ iO†(t)
∂|Ψ(t)〉
∂t
=
= iO˙†(t)O(t)|Ψ′(t)〉+O†(t)H(t)O(t)O†(t)|Ψ(t)〉. (77)
Defining
H˜(t) := iO˙†(t)O(t) +O†(t)H(t)O(t), (78)
we can therefore write
i
∂|Ψ′(t)〉
∂t
= H˜(t)|Ψ′(t)〉. (79)
(The operator H˜(t) is indeed self-adjoint.) As we said, |Ψ′(t)〉 gives rise to time-
independent definite-valued projections, which are in fact just Pi(0), so that the
current given by (71) is applicable:
jji(t) = 2Im
[
〈Ψ′(t)|Pj(0)H˜(t)Pi(0)|Ψ
′(t)〉
]
. (80)
Substituting in for H˜(t) and using the equality O(t)Pj(0)O
†(t) = Pj(t), we get:
jji(t) = 2Im
[
i〈Ψ(t)|O(t)Pj(0)O˙
†(t)Pi(t)|Ψ(t)〉+ 〈Ψ(t)|Pj(t)H(t)Pi(t)|Ψ(t)〉
]
(81)
(where we have also used (75)). Now note that
P˙j(t) = O˙(t)Pj(0)O
†(t) +O(t)Pj(0)O˙
†(t) =
= O˙(t)O†(t)Pj(t) + Pj(t)O(t)O˙
†(t), (82)
so that
O(t)Pj(0)O˙
†(t)Pi = P˙j(t)Pi(t)− O˙(t)O
†(t)Pj(t)Pi(t). (83)
But the second term in the right-hand side of (83) is zero when i 6= j (and when i = j
the entire current is zero anyway, as is clear already from (80)). Therefore (81) is
jji(t) = 2Im
[
i〈Ψ(t)|P˙j(t)Pi(t)|Ψ(t)〉+ 〈Ψ(t)|Pj(t)H(t)Pi(t)|Ψ(t)〉
]
=
= 2Im
[
〈Ψ(t)|Pj(t)H(t)Pi(t)|Ψ(t)〉
]
+ 〈Ψ(t)|P˙j(t)Pi(t)|Ψ(t)〉+ 〈Ψ(t)|Pi(t)P˙j(t)|Ψ(t)〉. (84)
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Finally, because Pi(t)Pj(t) = 0 for i 6= j we have
d
dt
[
Pi(t)Pj(t)
]
= P˙i(t)Pj(t) + Pi(t)P˙j(t) = 0, (85)
so that Pi(t)P˙j(t) = −P˙i(t)Pj(t) and the current in (84) is therefore antisymmetric.
Indeed, we can rewrite it as:
jji(t) = 2Im
[
〈Ψ(t)|Pj(t)H(t)Pi(t)|Ψ(t)〉
]
+〈Ψ(t)|
(
P˙j(t)Pi(t)−P˙i(t)Pj(t)
)
|Ψ(t)〉. (86)
The current in (86) is a natural generalization of the Schro¨dinger current. Note in
particular that when P˙i(t) = P˙j(t) = 0, (86) reduces to the Schro¨dinger current of
Bell and Vink. (Actually, only one of P˙i(t) or P˙j(t) need be zero.)
It is also useful to see explicitly that (86) satisfies the continuity equation (47).
That it does so is clear from the fact that
∑
i P˙i(t) = 0, so that the extra term in
the generalized current summed over i gives 〈ψ(t)|P˙j(t)|ψ(t)〉, which is just the extra
term in p˙j(t) as given in (72).
We stress, however, that although the current in (86) is in some sense ‘natural’, it
is certainly not the only current that generalizes the Schro¨dinger current. Indeed, to
get a generalized Schro¨dinger current, we need only add to the Schro¨dinger current
some antisymmetric term that, when summed over i, gives 〈ψ(t)|P˙j(t)|ψ(t)〉.
12 For
example, the expression
〈ψ(t)|
1
D
(
P˙ (t)− P˙i(t)
)
|ψ(t)〉, (87)
which is reminiscent of the minimal flow dynamics, is also an adequate extra term
(where D is the cardinality of S.)
In any case, using (86) we can now define infinitesimal parameters by (53). By
the results of Section 3.1, we are allowed to assume analyticity of the probabilities
pi(t). In fact, the pi(t) will have only isolated zeros, and therefore the jji(t)/pi(t) will
be singular at most on a set of isolated points. Further, it is easy to see also that
the jji(t) are analytic, because by the results of Section 3.1 the projections Pi(t) are.
Therefore, the singularities of jji(t)/pi(t) are just poles, and thus both jji(t)/pi(t) and
tji(t) = max{0, jji(t)/pi(t)} are continuous functions with values in [−∞,∞].
Poles, however, are non-integrable singularities, and thus Theorems 1 and 2 only
ensure that we can canonically construct a Markov process for the evolution of the
possessed properties between the singularities. The question of the existence of global
solutions is not yet settled. On the other hand, the situation is not surprising and
possibly no great cause of concern, if one notes that the same problem arises also in
the case of the Bohm theory, and that further, in the latter case, the existence and
uniqueness of global solutions has been demonstrated under quite general conditions
(Berndl et al. 1995).
To be precise, in the Bohm theory the guidance equation,
d
dt
xi(t) =
ji(x1, . . . ,xN , t)
ρ(x1, . . . ,xN , t)
, (88)
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will become singular when ρ(x1, . . . ,xN , t) = 0. However, Berndl et al. (1995) have
shown that for a wide class of potentials the guidance equation admits unique global
solutions for generic initial conditions. One can expect that for our choice of current
and for Bell’s choice of infinitesimal parameters, results similar to Berndl et al.’s will
hold also in the modal interpretation.
As a final remark, we show that, as claimed before, pi(t) = 0 implies jji(t) =
0. Writing pi(t) = 〈ψ(t)|Pi(t)|ψ(t)〉 it becomes clear that pi(t) = 0 if and only if
Pi(t)|ψ(t)〉 = 0. In that case, (86) is
jji(t) = −〈ψ(t)|P˙i(t)Pj(t)|ψ(t)〉. (89)
And, because Pi(t)P˙j(t) = −P˙i(t)Pj(t), (89) is
jji(t) = 〈ψ(t)|Pi(t)P˙j(t)|ψ(t)〉, (90)
which is zero (under our assumption that Pi(t)|ψ(t)〉 = 0).
In this section, we have discussed the construction of a Markovian dynamics at
the level of the total system for the evolution of the complete state in the atomic
version (at least in the finite-dimensional case). The next section is devoted to the
analysis of certain aspects of the (generally non-Markovian) dynamics induced on the
atomic subsystems. In particular, we show that the choice (86) for the current leads to
transition probabilities whose marginals are deterministic for freely evolving atomic
systems.
5 Properties of the Generalized Schro¨dinger Dynamics
5.1 Determinism for Free Atomic Systems
Our discussion thus far leaves open the question of the properties of the dynamics
of subsystems. Here we will begin to investigate these properties. In this subsection,
we will be concerned with the dynamics of a freely evolving atomic system. We will
show that such a system evolves deterministically, as discussed in Section 4.2. In the
next subsection, we make a few remarks towards a general account of the dynamics
of subsystems.
For simplicity of notation, we concentrate on the atomic system α, and use i
and j to label its states. The joint states of all of the other atomic systems in the
universe we denote with collective indices m and n. To show that when α evolves
freely, it evolves deterministically, we must show that whenever the Hamiltonian for
the universe takes the form H = Hα ⊗ 1Iβ...ω + 1Iα ⊗Hβ...ω—i.e., whenever there are
no interactions between α and the rest of the universe—the infinitesimal parameters
are such that for all n and for all i,m such that pim(t) 6= 0, tjn;im(t) = 0 whenever
i 6= j.
One nice way to prove this claim is by using again the time-dependent transfor-
mation O(t) used in the derivation of the generalized Schro¨dinger current that we
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gave in the previous section. Recall that there we defined the family of unitary oper-
ators, O(t), to be such that Pi(t) = O(t)Pi(0)O
†(t), for every Pi(t) ∈ S(t). When the
Hamiltonian for the compound system is H = Hα ⊗ 1Iβ...ω + 1Iα ⊗ Hβ...ω, α evolves
according to its own unitary group,
U(t) = e−iH
αt. (91)
Hence the definite-valued projections for α evolve according to P αi (t) =
U(t)P αi (0)U
†(t). It follows that the definite-valued projections for the compound
system, which may be denoted P αi (t)⊗ Pm(t), evolve according to
P αi (t)⊗ Pm(t) = U(t)⊗ V (t)P
α
i (0)⊗ Pm(0)U
†(t)⊗ V †(t) (92)
where {V (t, s)} (with V (t) := V (t, 0)) is the appropriate family of unitary operators
on the rest of the universe. [Note that V (t) bears no simple relation to the evolution
operator on the rest of the universe, which is e−iH
β...ωt.]
We are going to substitute U(t) ⊗ V (t) for O(t) in (78). To do so, we need to
know its derivative as well. It is:
d
dt
[
U(t)⊗ V (t)
]
=
d
dt
[
e−iH
αt ⊗ V (t)
]
=
= −iHαU(t)⊗ V (t) + U(t)⊗ V˙ (t). (93)
Hence the effective Hamiltonian H˜(t) takes the form
H˜(t) = i
d
dt
[
U(t)⊗ V (t)
]†(
U(t)⊗ V (t)
)
+
(
U(t)⊗ V (t)
)†
H
(
U(t)⊗ V (t)
)
=
= −U †(t)HαU(t)⊗ V †(t)V (t) + U †(t)U(t)⊗ V˙ †(t)V (t) +
+U †(t)HαU(t)⊗ V †(t)V (t) + U †(t)U(t)⊗ V †(t)Hβ...ωV (t) =
= 1Iα ⊗
(
V˙ †(t)V (t) + V †(t)Hβ...ωV (t)
)
=
= 1Iα ⊗ H˜β...ω. (94)
And thus, (80) becomes
jjn;im(t) = 2Im
[
〈Ψ′(t)|P αj (0)P
α
i (0)⊗ Pn(0)H˜
β...ωPm(0)|Ψ
′(t)〉
]
, (95)
which is obviously zero for j 6= i. And therefore, given the choice (53) for the
tjn;im(t), we find that tjn;im(t) is zero whenever i 6= j, providing that pim(t) 6= 0.
Hence we have shown that the freely evolving system, α, evolves determinsitically,
following the evolution of the P αi (t) according to U(t). (An alternative proof is given
by Bacciagaluppi (1996a, Ch. 7, and 1998a).)
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The reader might well be wondering why we did not follow an apparently much
easier route to the same conclusion. This easier route would have us sum the current,
jjn;im(t), over the collective index, m, to find a ‘marginal’ current for α. We could
then calculate directly the transition probabilities for α, and it would in fact be trivial
to show that they are deterministic when α evolves freely. But this method is fatally
flawed: given Bell’s solution (53), a little thought shows that one cannot calculate
transition probabilities for a subsystem by summing the compound system’s current
over the other indices.
5.2 General Subsystems
Hence the calculation of transition probabilities for general subsystems of the
universe is a non-trivial problem. We present in this section just a summary of
minor results on this question. (For further discussion of these and related points
about dynamics in modal interpretations, see Bacciagaluppi (1996a, 1998a, 1998b)
and Dickson (1995c, 1998).)
First, the result on deterministic evolution of the previous subsection allows one
to derive already some (finite-time) transition probabilities for special cases of atomic
systems that do interact with their environment. This can be done by using a tech-
nique due to Vermaas (1996). Namely, transition probabilities pji(t, s) can be derived
for an interacting system when either at t or at s its definite properties are in one-
to-one correlation with the properties of a freely evolving system (which we must
assume to be atomic). Thus, for instance, the transition probabilities for an ideal
measurement of an arbitrary observable of one of two entangled atomic systems can
be readily calculated. Interestingly enough, in this case the dependence of the mea-
surement result on the possessed property of the measured system has the same form
as the Born rule of standard quantum mechanics.
Further, one can show (as in Bacciagaluppi (1996a, Ch. 7.4)) that deterministic
evolution holds true also of an atomic system that is interacting with its environment,
but whose definite properties commute with the interaction Hamiltonian. Thus, one
can show that an ideal measurement of an already possessed property of an atomic
system does not disturb the possessed property of the system. Similarly, if the system
is decohered by its environment, the definite properties of the system will approxi-
mately correspond, except in cases of strong near-degeneracy, to the eigenspaces of the
decohering observable (which commutes with the interaction Hamiltonian, see e.g.,
Zurek (1981)). Hence, an atomic system whose only interaction with its environment
is by ways of decoherence, will also (at least approximately) follow a deterministic
evolution. In particular, if one idealises a measuring apparatus as having a discrete
pointer observable that is decohered (again as in Zurek (1981)) and, further, as being
an atomic system, then after the measurement is completed, the pointer readings of
the apparatus will not exhibit any stochastic jumps.13
The results by Vermaas (1996) and this generalization can be used to furnish good
examples of the ‘non-Born-like’ form of the transition probabilities (unlike the special
case mentioned above), and of the non-Markovian behavior of interacting subsystems
(and at the same time indications of when Markovian approximations might be pos-
sible). Further, they illustrate how, in these toy models, the possessed properties of
atomic systems play the role of hidden variables, determining in part the outcomes of
measurements on the system. From this point of view, the atomic modal interpreta-
tion equipped with our dynamics has many points of contact with the Bohm theory,
not least the non-locality resulting from the dependence of the transition probabilities
of one system on the actually possessed properties of other systems (analogously to
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the guidance equation for one particle depending on the positions of the other parti-
cles). Problems arising in the Bohm theory can be developed and discussed also in
the context of the modal interpretation, as frame-dependence of trajectories (Dickson
and Clifton 1998) and the justification of the distribution postulate, i.e., the ‘initial’
single-time probabilities (Bacciagaluppi, Barrett and Dickson 1997).
In addition, there are ‘standard’ questions from the theory of stochastic processes
to be asked. For example, there are, in fact, distinctions to be made among various
versions of the Markov property, and we may ask which, if any, hold, and under
what conditions. Also, there is a well-developed theory of semi-group formulations
of Markov processes. It would be worth seeing how to formulate the processes we
describe here in this way, so that the powerful theory of semigroups could be brought
to bear on certain questions.
Finally, the work we have done here might be adaptable to other interpretations.
In the first place, it might be adaptable to some modal interpretation for continuous
observables, although such an interpretation has yet to be fully worked out (for recent
work in this direction, see Clifton (1997)). For this case, there is already in place a
well-developed theory of diffusion processes (continuous-time Markov processes with
continuous state spaces) upon which a dynamics can draw. In this case, the powerful
theory of stochastic differential equations could also be useful, and indeed we may hold
out the prospect of genuine (generally stochastic) equations of motion for the modal
interpretation. And apart ¿from modal interpretations for continuous observables, our
work may well apply to other interpretations. For example, it may show how to define
a dynamics for the quantum logic interpretation (on which, see Dickson (1998)), or for
the many worlds interpretation. Of course, these remarks are somewhat speculative,
but what is clear is that there is more interesting work to be done.
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NOTES
1. For specific proposals, see Van Fraassen (1979; 1991, Ch. 9), Kochen (1985), Dieks
(1988, 1989, 1994), Healey (1989), Bub (1992, 1994), and Vermaas and Dieks (1995).
2. The reason is clear: we would like to be able to represent, in a sensible way,
probabilities of conjunctions, disjunctions, and negations of events, and to do so, we
need some algebraic operations to represent conjunction, disjunction, and negation.
(We mention this point because at least one modal interpretation, that of Healey
(1989), apparently does not choose a set of possible properties that forms an algebra
or partial algebra, at least not under the lattice-theoretic operations.)
3. For a statement of the problem, see, for example, Albert and Loewer (1990, 1993)
and Elby (1993). Discussions of and solutions to the original problem were given by
Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo (1994, 1996), Dickson (1994), Healey (1993a, 1993b), and
Ruetsche (1995). Recently, however, serious new problems have emerged—see Bac-
ciagaluppi (1996b), Bacciagaluppi, Donald and Vermaas (1995), and Donald (1997)—
which, we believe, show the inadequacy of the non-atomic versions.
4. There are as well other constraints that might be imposed. See Clifton (1995a,
1995b, 1996), Dickson (1995a, 1995c), Bub and Clifton (1996), Bub (1997), and Dieks
(1995) for discussions. For very general discussions of constraints on the algebraic
structure of the set of definite-valued properties see Bell and Clifton (1995), Dickson
(1995b, 1996), and Zimba and Clifton (1997).
5. A consideration of dynamics also turns out to be important for the discussion of
state preparation followed by measurement. See Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo (1997). In
addition, it has been argued elsewhere (Dickson 1995c, 1995d) that one way (though
not the only way) to make sense of the modal interpretation’s denial of the projection
postulate is to give the uncollapsed state dynamical significance (so as not to make it
superfluous). The only way to do so convincingly is to exhibit a reasonable dynamics
in which the uncollapsed state plays a crucial role. Finally, an account of dynamics
is crucial in the consideration of Lorentz-invariance—see Dickson and Clifton (1997).
6. See, however, the discussion by Bell (1976) in the context of the Everett interpre-
tation.
7. The definition of pji(t, s) given in (30) also yields an interpretation of the patho-
logical case ∑
j
pji(t, s) < 1. (96)
In fact, if (96) holds, one can say there is a nonzero probability for an infinite number
of jumps to occur in the finite time interval [s, t]. Solutions with (96) are called quasi-
processes, or dishonest, or non-conservative processes. For example, if j represents the
number of individuals in a population,
∑
j pji(t, s) < 1 means that there is nonzero
probability for a transition from i individuals to infinitely many individuals in the
finite time interval [s, t].
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On the other hand, Feller shows that if the tii(t) are bounded uniformly in i by a
function pi(t) such that ∫ T2
T1
pi(t)αdt <∞ (97)
for some α > 1, then ∑
j
pji(t, s) = 1. (98)
In particular, if I is finite, then pi(t) := max
i
|tii| is integrable to any power α > 1 on
every open interval ]s, t[ with T1 < s < t < T2. Thus, (98) is satisfied on any such
interval, and consequently on the whole of ]T1, T2[.
8. A clarification of ‘free evolution’: it might be supposed that ‘unitary evolution’
and ‘free evolution’ are equivalent in quantum mechanics. They are not. A system
evolves freely between times s and t if and only if each member of the family of
unitary operators U(t, t′) (s ≤ t′ ≤ t) that carries the system’s state from time t′ to
time t is a homogenous function of time, i.e., is a function only of the difference t− t′,
in which case U(t, t′) is generated by some time-independent Hamiltonian.
9. Actually, Bell’s expression for tji is not exactly (53), but
tji :=


jji
pi
for jji > 0,
for jji ≤ 0.
(99)
The difference arises precisely when jji = pi = 0, where (53) may be infinite, while
(99) is zero. Our choice is continuous at these exceptional points.
10. Here is a direct proof. Suppose that for all j,
∫ T0
T0−ε
∣∣∣∣∣jji(t)pi(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ dt <∞, (100)
where T0 is a zero of pi(t). Then also∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T0
T0−ε
∑
j jij(t)
pi(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣ =
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T0
T0−ε
∑
j jji(t)
pi(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
j
∫ T0
T0−ε
∣∣∣∣∣jji(t)pi(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ dt <∞, (101)
by (46), the triangle inequality and (100). However,
∑
j jij(t) = p˙i(t), by (47), and
p˙i(t)/pi(t) has a logarithmic, thus non-integrable, singularity at T0:∫ T0
T0−ε
p˙i(t)
pi(t)
dt =
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= −
∫ T0
T0−ε
d
dt
log pi(t)dt = − log pi(t)
∣∣∣T0
T0−ε
=∞. (102)
Thus, at least for some j, (100) must fail.
11. The example to follow is based on an example suggested to us by David Albert
at the Workshop on Quantum Measurement, University of Minnesota, May 1995.
12. From this point of view, we can see the construction of the current in (86) as
follows. Two expressions that, when summed over i, obviously yield the extra term
in p˙j(t) are
〈ψ(t)|P˙j(t)Pi(t)|ψ(t)〉 (103)
and
〈ψ(t)|Pi(t)P˙j(t)|ψ(t)〉. (104)
Neither (103) nor (104) are in general real, but they are complex conjugates of one
another. Hence by adding them, we get a real number, and (using Pi(t)P˙j(t) =
−P˙i(t)Pj(t)) their sum is anti-symmetric and, indeed, just the term that we added to
the Schro¨dinger current to get (86).
13. The requirements of decoherence (and thus macroscopicity) of the pointer and at
the same time of atomic behavior (in the sense of our dynamics) will not necessarily
go hand in hand. Further, as hinted in note 3, in more realistic (infinite- or high-
dimensional) models, not even the definiteness of pointer readings seems given (see in
particular Bacciagaluppi (1996b)). As toy models for the dynamics, however, these
examples serve their purpose.
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